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Abstract
This paper examines the role of monetary policy in the presence of endogenous time prefer-
ence. The framework in which this issue is addressed is a monetary model with cash-in-advance
constraints and an additional trading friction that is typical of the class of “liquidity models” of the
monetary business cycle. We find that the nature of the optimal policy designed to remove these
distortions gets modified in the presence of endogenous utility discounting. Consequently the role
of monetary policy is significantly altered. Specifically, monetary policy is likely to be less activist
relative to the model with a fixed rate of time preference.
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1. Introduction 
 
Relaxing the assumption of a fixed rate of time preference has had interesting 
implications for various issues addressed within the framework of dynamic 
general equilibrium models.  Some of the recent work incorporating 
endogenous time preference explores its implications for issues such as the 
effects of fiscal policy on economic aggregates, the dynamics of the current 
account, and the existence of indeterminacies.  See for example, Chang et al 
(1998), Devereux (1991), Dolmas and Wynne (1998), Ikeda (2001), 
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), among others.  A relatively unexplored 
issue that has been addressed in Lahiri (2002) is the impact of monetary 
shocks on economies characterized by endogenous time preference.  She finds 
that inflation-tax effects are enhanced in the presence of endogenous time 
preference, leading to a larger contribution of monetary shocks to the 
fluctuations of real variables.  This result, in part, motivates the study of 
optimal monetary policy that is conducted in this paper.  The model of this 
paper, however, differs from the monetary model in Lahiri (2002), which is an 
extension of the standard “cash-in-advance” model of the Cooley and Hansen 
(1989).  Here we examine the role of monetary policy in the presence of an 
additional trading friction, one that is typical of the class of “liquidity models” 
of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
       An appealing aspect of the flexible or endogenous time preference 
framework is that it is more general, in the sense that the fixed discount factor 
environment is nested as a special case. It is then of interest to see whether the 
role of monetary policy is sensitive to this generalization.  In view of the 
ability of liquidity models to account for several empirical regularities, they 
are perhaps more appropriate as a framework to address the issue of optimal 
monetary policy. ( See, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1998, and 
references therein).  Furthermore, it is also quite obvious that the introduction 
of endogenous time preference in a “standard” cash-in-advance framework 
would simply lead to a modified Friedman rule that recommends deflation at 
the variable rate of time preference.  While this is interesting in itself, 
liquidity models add another dimension to the issue of optimal monetary 
policy. In liquidity models the additional trading friction is responsible for a 
more activist role for monetary policy.  Fuerst’s (1994) paper, for example, 
demonstrates that, for a range of preference parameters, there can be a role for 
strongly activist monetary policy, in the sense that it is countercyclical to 
productivity shocks.  This is an interesting result, since standard cash-in-
advance models typically fail to yield an activist role for monetary policy even 
though significant non-neutralities are present. Modifying preferences by 
introducing endogenous time preference further changes the role of policy by 
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altering the conditions it needs to satisfy in order to remove both inflation tax 
and liquidity distortions. 
       The benchmark model chosen for this experiment is that of Fuerst (1992, 
1994). While this framework is perhaps too stylized relative to monetary 
models of more recent years, it is suitable as an exploratory first step in the 
direction of examining how the nature of optimal monetary policy is altered in 
the presence of endogenous discounting. The aim here is to extract some 
intuition for the nature of interaction between flexibility in time preference 
and the some of the distortions present in monetary models. Endogenous time 
preference is incorporated by replacing the fixed utility discount factor by a 
discount factor that is a function of contemporaneous utility, and is hence 
affected by the levels of consumption and leisure.  Preferences are then no 
longer time additive, although they remain recursive, as in fixed discount 
factor environments.  It is assumed, following Epstein (1983) that the discount 
factor is decreasing in utility, reflecting the idea that individuals become more 
“impatient” with increases in current utility benefits.  While there is some 
controversy about the intuitive plausibility of this assumption, often referred 
to as increasing marginal impatience, it is a necessary condition for the 
dynamic stability of models that incorporate such preferences.1  In addition, it 
is useful in eliminating some innately implausible implications of fixed time 
preference models.  For example, Lucas and Stokey (1984) show that in a 
heterogeneous agent economy with consumers having fixed but different 
discount factors, some very stark theoretical predictions emerge: the 
economy’s steady-state wealth ends up with the most patient consumer.  The 
increasing marginal impatience assumption is needed to prevent such a 
degenerate steady-state for the economy.  By similar analogy, it is also 
required in small open economy models, in order that the economy’s long run 
debt position is well defined.2   
       The key result of this paper is that, in the presence of flexible time 
preference, the optimal monetary policy is of a less activist nature in 
comparison to the benchmark model.  The differences in the nature of optimal 
monetary policy are related to the way in which the benchmark economy and 
its variable time preference extension respond to productivity shocks. 
Specifically, the differences in optimal monetary policy in liquidity models 
arise due to the inability of agents to transfer funds across goods and financial 
                                                        
   1Epstein postulates conditions under which preferences of this kind are consistent with 
expected utility, and the dynamic stability of these models. The original formulation was 
due to Uzawa (1968), which was extended and refined in Epstein’s work.  For a 
discussion of economists’ views about the increasing marginal impatience assumption see 
Lahiri (2002). 
   2For a discussion see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
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markets quickly and without cost.  The monetary authority, however, can 
eliminate this “liquidity risk” for them by varying the size of the monetary 
injection in response to technology shocks.  This is the underlying intuition for 
the optimal monetary policy being correlated (positively or negatively) to 
technology shocks, and applies to both the fixed and flexible time preference 
economies.  The differences in the nature and magnitude of this correlation in 
the two economies are then a natural consequence of the fact that the impact 
of productivity shocks is dissimilar.     
       The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows.  Section 2 
describes the economic environment, which can be described as an extension 
of the Fuerst (1992, 1994) models, and briefly discusses the impact of money 
growth shocks on nominal interest rates.  Section 3 analyses the results based 
on numerical simulations of the model.  Section 4 concludes.   
 
2.  The Economic Environment 
 
We consider an economy with identical, infinitely lived households, which 
maximize expected lifetime utility given by 
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where tc  and tL  are time t consumption and work effort, and the endogenous 
discount factor )(uβ must be of the form )(ue φ− , 0)( >uφ , in order to be 
consistent with expected utility, as shown in Epstein (1983).  Also,  
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where A >0.   
       The function uu τηφ +=)( , so that an increase in utility causes a decrease 
in the discount factor - the household becomes more impatient with respect to 
future utility. The function u must be negative, strictly increasing with )ln( u−  
convex in the composite consumption-leisure good.  It is also required that φ  
is positive, increasing in, and strictly concave with respect to the composite 
good and that )(ueu φ′  is nonincreasing with respect to the composite good.3  It 
                                                        
   3These restrictions ensure that a stable steady state distribution for the state variables 
exists and is unique.  Although these conditions are specified for the case in which the 
utility function has only one argument, viz. consumption, results in Epstein (1983) should 
go through if consumption and leisure are treated as a composite commodity.  
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is easy to check that the functional form considered here satisfies these 
properties. 
       The households in this economy purchase consumption goods from firms, 
which produce a homogeneous consumption-investment good, using a 
stochastic production technology.  This technology is of the Cobb-Douglas 
form, given by 
                                  ),1,0(,)(),( ∈= γθ γttt HssHf  
where tH  denotes the labor services firms purchase from households.  The 
vector Ss t ∈  denotes the state of the economy at time t.  The positive and 
continuous variable )(sθ  represents productivity shocks in the goods sector. 
       To introduce money into the economy, cash in advance constraints are 
imposed on all purchases carried out by both consumers and firms.  The cash 
in advance constraint on consumers is given by 
                                                ,tttt cpnm ≥−  
where tm  is the amount of money balances the household holds at the 
beginning of period t, and tn  is the portion of these balances that the 
household deposits with intermediaries in the financial sector, and tp is the 
price of the consumption good.  (All nominal variables are measured relative 
to the beginning-of-period per-capita nominal money stock.) 
       Firms, on the other hand, use tb  units of cash borrowed from financial 
intermediaries in the credit market to finance purchases of tH  units of labor 
services from households.  The cash in advance constraint on firms is thus 
given by 
                                                .ttt Hwb ≥  
       Finally, the financial sector of the economy consists of financial 
intermediaries who accept cash deposits tn  from households, in addition to 
receiving the monetary injection tx  from the central bank.  The assumptions 
regarding the timing of this decision are the same as the liquidity models 
discussed in the previous section; the decision is made before ts  is revealed, 
and cannot be altered until the next period. 
       It is convenient, at this point, to reiterate Fuerst's (1992) interpretation of 
the timing of events and the nature of transactions specific to this structure.  
We assume that the economy is populated with a large number of “families” 
which consist of members that engage in different trades.  A representative 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
Restrictions specified in Epstein (1983) should then be satisfied w.r.t. this composite 
commodity. For a discussion of these assumptions see Mendoza (1991), and Dolmas and 
Wynne (1998). 
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family consists of a worker-shopper pair, a firm manager, and a financial 
intermediary.  After deciding that tn  and tt nm − units are allocated to the 
financial intermediary and shopper respectively, the family separates and each 
member travels to distinct locations, and the state of the world - the monetary 
shock and the technology shock, are revealed.  The shopper is in the goods 
market to purchase goods for consumption, while the worker offers tL  units of 
labor in the labor market.  The firm and financial intermediary are in the credit 
market.  The firm borrows ttt xnb +=  dollars from the financial intermediary, 
to be repaid at the end of the period at a positive nominal interest rate of tR , 
and then travels to the labor market.  The firm then offers to hire tH  units of 
labor at the nominal wage rate of tw .  Using the borrowings tb  to finance the 
wage bill, the firm uses labor services to produce output for sale in the goods 
market.  Liquidity effects arise in this model in the same sense as in Fuerst 
(1992): A large monetary injection implies that interest rates must fall in order 
to induce firms to induce firms to absorb the excess cash in the financial 
market.  The excess cash in the hands of the firm also stimulates labor 
demand, and consequently employment and output. 
       At the end of the period, the firm repays the loan from the financial 
intermediary, and all members of the representative family reunite and pool 
their cash receipts.  The family therefore enters period t+1 with money 
balances given by 
]),([)]1([][
)1(1
tttttttttttttttt
tt
RbHwsHfpRxcpLwRnm
xm
−−+++−++=
++   
We can now describe the household’s optimization problem.  Since we focus 
only on stationary equilibria, we omit time subscripts in what follows.  Let (m, 
s) denote the beginning of period cash balances and the state of the system 
respectively, and ( sm ′′, ) the corresponding next period’s values.  Let 
),( smV represent the value function corresponding to the household’s 
problem.  The household’s dynamic programming problem is then given by  
)1(),,()},())1,(()1,({maxmax),(
,,,],0[
sdssmVLcuLcusmV
HbLcmn
′Φ′′−+−= ∫∈ β  
subject to 
    )2(,pcnm ≥−  
    )3(,wHb ≥  
   )4(,
1
),()1(
x
bRwHsHpfRxpcwLnRmm +
−−′+++−++=′  
where ),( smV  represents the value function corresponding to the family's 
problem. 
5
Lahiri: Liquidity Effects, Variable Time Preference
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
       In a stationary equilibrium, the household’s decision rules will be fixed 
functions of the state of the system, and will consist of prices and wages such 
that the relevant markets clear. The equilibrium conditions in the goods 
market, the money market, the labor market, and the credit market are 
respectively given by: ),),,,(( sssmHfc ′′= 1==′ mm , 
),,(),,( ssmHssmL ′=′ , )(),(),,( sxsmnssmb ′+′=′ .  Specifically, the 
equilibrium is defined below: 
Definition: An equilibrium consists of strictly positive continuous functions 
),,( ssp ′ ),,( ssw ′ and ),,( ssR ′ a value function V, and policy functions 
),,,( smn  ),,,( ssmc ′ and ),,,( ssmL ′ such that 
(i) Given p, w, R, the value function V satisfies (1), and n, c, L, H are the 
policy functions associated with the household’s problem, 
(ii)  ,,),,,1(),,1( 2SssssHssL ∈′∀′=′  
(iii)  ,,),),,,1((),,1( 2SsssssHfssc ∈′∀′′=′  
(iv)  .,),(),1(),,1( 2Ssssxsnssb ∈′∀′+′=′  
       Denote by ),,,1(1 ss ′λ and ),,,1(2 ss ′λ  the Lagrangian multipliers associated 
with constraints (2) and (3) respectively.  After imposing the equilibrium 
conditions, the first order conditions for n , c , L , b , H , 1λ , and 2λ  may be 
expressed as 
)5(,),(),,1(
),(
)(1
),(),1())),,1(1),,,1(((
∫
∫
′Φ′=
′Φ′+
′′′−′
sdsss
sds
sx
ssRsVssLsscu m
λ
β
 
       )},1())),,1(1),,,1(((1)){,,1(1),,,1((1 sVssLsscussLsscu ′′−′′+′−′ β  
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                                                       )9(),,(),,1(2 sswss ′′= λ  
  )10(,0),,1(),,,1(),(),1(1 1 >′′′≥− ssifequalitywithsscsspsn λ   
)11(.0),,1(),,,1(),()(),1( 2 >′′′≥′+ ssifequalitywithssLsswsxsn λ  
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The Envelope condition is given by:   
∫ ′Φ′ ′′−′′+′−′
=
),(
),(
)},1())),,1(1),,,1(((1)){,,1(1),,,1((
),1(
1 sds
ssp
sVssLsscussLsscu
sVm
β  
                                                                                                )12(  
The equilibrium conditions above collapse to their fixed time preference 
versions when we set )(uβ′ equal to zero, and replace the endogenous 
discount factor by a fixed discount factor.  Here, equations (7) and (9) may be 
interpreted as representing the supply and demand side of the labor market, 
and together with the cash-in-advance constraint (11) and market clearing 
condition (ii) pin down the wage rate.  Likewise, the consumer’s optimal 
choice of consumption is reflected in (8) and represents the demand side of the 
goods market.  Combined with the market clearing condition (iii) and the 
cash-in-advance constraint (10), this determines the equilibrium price in the 
goods market. 
       In the next section, we focus on a special case of this economy in which 
the state of the world is assumed to be to be independently and identically 
distributed.  Focussing on the i.i.d case helps us illustrate the sources of the 
differences between the optimal monetary policy in the fixed and flexible 
discount factor economies in a manner that is relatively stark and insightful.  
In the case of serially correlated productivity shocks, it is intuitively clear that 
agents will have already made an adjustment for past productivity shocks 
when they take their portfolio allocation decision.  The monetary authority, 
then, only needs to respond to the current productivity shock. In the next 
section we describe the computational procedures used to find the equilibrium 
and the optimal monetary policy in the i.i.d case, and analyse the results of 
several numerical experiments. 
 
3. Analysis of Quantitative Experiments 
 
By manipulating the first order conditions above, we can show that by 
construction, the equilibrium is represented by functions )1,0(),1( ∈sn , 
0),1( >sVm , and )1,0(),,1( ∈′ssL , and the value function ),1( sV ′ that satisfy 
  
)13(,),(
))(1)}(,1()),,1((1{),,1(
),,1()),1(1()],1()),,1(([
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),1(1
)},1()),,1((1){,,1()),,1(
2
2
1
∫
∫
′Φ′+′′′+′
′−′′=
′Φ−
′′′+′′
sds
sxsVssuAssf
ssfsnsVssu
sds
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sVssussfssu
Lm
β
β
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     )14(,
))(1)}(,1()),,1((1{
))(),1()(,1()),,1((),,1(
sxsVssuA
sxsnsVssussL m ′+′′′+
′+′′=′ β
β  
    )15(),,(
),1(1
)},1()),,1((1){,,1(),,1(),1( 1 sds
sn
sVssussfssusVm ′Φ−
′′′+′′= ∫ β  
in addition to the Bellman equation, which is given by, 
)16().,()],1(),,1((),,1([),1( sdssVssussusV ′′′Φ′′′′′+′′′=′ ∫ β  
In the above four equations we have economized on notation by writing some 
of the expressions that appear in the first order conditions in the previous 
section in abbreviated form.  Thus )),,1(1),,,1((1 ssLsscu ′−′ , the partial 
derivative of the period utility function with respect to its first argument, is 
written as ),,1(1 ssu ′ , and the expressions )),,,1(( sssLf ′′  and )),,,1(( sssLfL ′′   
are written as ),,1( ssf ′  and ),,1( ssfL ′  respectively.  We have also used the 
additively separable nature of the period utility function assumed in the 
previous section and substituted for AssLsscu =′−′ )),,1(1),,,1((2 . 
       In what follows we will focus on numerical experiments based on the 
assumption that the state space is finite, consisting of N elements, and that the 
shocks are independently and identically distributed.  In this case, it is natural 
to conjecture that n and mV  and V are constants, and L depends only on s′ . 
With a finite state space, we can think of the work-effort function L  as a 
vector consisting of N elements.  It is easy to see that the computation of 
equilibrium in the fixed time preference case( 0)( =′ uβ ) is relatively 
straightforward.  With 0)( =′ uβ , the form of equations (13)-(15), is 
simplified considerably, and the procedure does not involve value function 
iteration.  The equilibrium conditions (13)-(15) represent N+2 nonlinear 
equations in N+2 unknowns.  After we choose values for N, σγβ ,, , the N-
vectors θ  and x , and also the corresponding vector representing the 
probabilities of each state, we can easily get the N+2 unknowns that solve 
(13)-(15).4  In the flexible time preference case, additional parameter values 
for η and τ need to be specified, and value function iteration is involved, since 
the term Vu)(β ′ appears in (13)-(15).  We use an initial guess for V, solve 
(13)-(15) for mVn, , and L , update the guess for V using the Bellman equation 
(16), and repeat this procedure until convergence is achieved. 
       For all of the simulations below, we use 4=N , 64.=γ , 1=A , 8.0=τ , 
and the probability of each state =.25.  For some of the results presented 
below, which contrast the effects of different types of monetary policies, we 
                                                        
   4The nonlinear equation solver of MATLAB, Version 6.13, was used to perform all the 
simulations in this paper. 
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assume 1=σ .  For the simulations involving the computation of the optimal 
monetary policy, we consider a larger range of values of σ .  The parameter η  
is chosen such that the deterministic steady state of the endogenous time 
preference model coincides with the fixed time preference model.  To that 
end, we choose η  such that 95.))(1),((( ==′−′ ββ sLscuE , where 95.=β  is 
the value of the discount factor in the fixed time preference model, and 
)(sc ′ and )(sL ′  are the equilibrium policy functions in the flexible discount 
factor model.5  
  
A.  The Effects of Monetary Policies 
 
In this sub-section we consider the effects of different types of monetary 
policies in economies with and without endogenous time preference.  First, we 
briefly look at the impact of monetary injections in and economy with no 
uncertainty in the real sector of the economy, i.e. with no technology shocks.  
The parameterisation of the discount factor is such that the pure liquidity 
effect in both economies is virtually identical, as can be verified from the 
results presented in Table 1.  These effects are well known in the literature, so 
we only present a brief discussion here. The upper panel in Table 1 presents 
the flexible discount factor economy, while the lower panel presents the 
corresponding fixed discount factor version.   There is a liquidity effect in 
both economies: interest rates are decreasing in the monetary injection.  Lower 
interest rates imply a lower opportunity cost of using cash to finance 
purchases of labor, so that equilibrium work effort, and therefore output are 
increasing in x .  To hire more units of labor, the firm has to offer a higher 
nominal wage, which is thus increasing in x .  The current price level, on the 
other hand, is decreasing in x , since the shopper in the goods market has a 
fixed supply of cash and the increased supply of output must bring down 
prices.  Another way to illustrate liquidity effects is to compare the marginal 
value of cash in the goods and financial markets, given by 1λ  and 2λ  
respectively - in both economies 1λ  is increasing in the monetary injection 
while 2λ  is decreasing in the monetary injection. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
   5Some manipulation of the equations (5), (6), (8) and (12) shows that this amounts to a  
parameterization of the fixed and flexible discount factor economies such that they have 
the same average interest rate and equilibrium choice of n . 
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Table 1.  Liquidity Effects  
 
Endogenous Time 
Preference 
 
5674.13
;3277.
=
=
mV
n
 
                   β τη τ( ) , .( )u e u= =− + 08 ;            
1,)log()1,( =−=− AALcLcu tttt ; 
                  c s Lt t t= =+θ γγ( ) , .1 0 64  
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
x  .03 .05 .07 .09 .06 .0258 
θ  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 
Consumption .9514 .9728 .9932 1.0126 .9825 .0263 
Labor .4910 .5083 .5251 .5412 .5164 .0216 
Interest Rates 1.2030 1.1393 1.0820 1.0302 1.1136 .0744 
Price Level .7067 .6911 .6769 .6640 .6847 .0184 
Wage Rate  .7285 .7430 .7574 .7718 .7502 .0186 
λ1  1.0515 1.2919 1.5215 1.7415 1.4016 .2969 
λ 2  2.5533 1.7120 .9858 .3553 1.4016 .9470 
β( )u  .9549 .9512 .9482 .9457 .95 .0040 
Cons./Mean Cons. .9684 .9901 1.0109 1.0306   
Labor/Mean Labor .9508 .9844 1.0168 1.0480   
Int. Rate/Mean Int. 
Rate 
1.0803 1.0231 .9716 .9251   
Prices/Mean Prices 1.0321 1.0094 .9887 .9697   
Wages/Mean Wages .9711 .9904 1.0096 1.0288   
λ1 /Mean λ1  .7502 .9217 1.0856 1.2425   
λ 2 /Mean λ 2  1.8218 1.2214 .7033 .2535   
Fixed Time 
Preference 
4872.1
;3277.
=
=
mV
n
 
 
                     0=τ . 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
x  .03 .05 .07 .09 .06 .0258 
θ  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 
Consumption .9509 .9725 .9931 1.0127 .9823 .0266 
Labor .4905 .5081 .5250 .5413 .5162 .0218 
Interest Rates 1.2034 1.1396 1.0823 1.0305 1.1139 .0144 
Price Level .7071 .6914 .6770 .6639 .6849 .0186 
Wage Rate  .7290 .7432 .7573 .7715 .7502 .0183 
λ1  .1155 .1416 .1668 .1910 .1537 .1032 
λ 2  .2789 .1879 .1087 .0395 .1537 .1032 
β  .95 .95 .95 .95 .95 0 
Cons./Mean Cons. .9680 .9900 1.0110 1.0310   
Labor/Mean Labor .9502 .9842 1.0170 1.0486   
Int. Rate/Mean Int. 
Rate 
1.0803 1.0231 .9716 .9251   
Prices/Mean Prices 1.0325 1.0095 .9886 .9694   
Wages/Mean Wages .9717 .9906 1.0094 1.0283   
λ1 /Mean λ1  .7513 .9213 1.0849 1.2425   
λ 2 /Mean λ 2  1.8144 1.2220 .7068 .2568   
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       Not having any significant differences in liquidity effects makes it easier 
to analyse the optimal monetary policies discussed below, as the differences in 
the optimal policies essentially arise form the differential impact of 
productivity shocks in the two economies. That is, whether the optimal 
monetary policy response to real shocks is procyclical, non-responsive, or 
countercyclical is related only to the nature of the impact of productivity 
shocks in the two economies.  To motivate the analysis that follows in the next 
sub-section, we briefly summarize the effects of such policies in Figures 1-3.  
In all three cases, 1=σ , and the vector of productivity shocks is given by [1.0, 
1.3, 1.6, 1.9].  Figure 1 presents the case in which monetary policy is 
deterministic, and the monetary growth is fixed at 6%.  Then, in Figures 2 and 
3 respectively, we look at the effects of monetary policy which is procyclical 
and countercyclical to technology shocks, represented respectively by the 
vectors [.03, .05, .07, .09], and [.09, .07, .05, .03], with ),( θxCov  equal to 
0.01 and -0.01.  In all three cases we examine the responses of consumption, 
work effort, interest rates expressed relative to their means in both 
economies.6  The fourth panel of these figures presents the discount factor in 
the fixed and flexible time preference economies.  All variables are plotted 
against θ , the shock to technology.  The solid line in each case represents the 
fixed time preference case and the dashed line represents the corresponding 
variable time preference version.    
                                                        
   6Other variables are easily inferred from the ones presented in the three figures.  For 
example, using the two CIA constraints, we can infer that wages are inversely related to 
work effort, and prices to consumption. 
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Fixed Time Preference              _____ 
Endogenous Time Preference   -------- 
 
Figure 1: Unresponsive Monetary Policy 
 
    
       It is clear from Figures 1-3, that the key difference between the two 
economies is the response of work effort to productivity shocks in the 
economy.  Since Figure 1 presents the case in which monetary policy is fixed 
or unresponsive, it brings out the effects of technology shocks in both 
economies.  It is clear from this figure that, in the log utility case, equilibrium 
work effort is independent of productivity shocks in the fixed time preference 
economy.  This is also true for 1≠σ , as will be explained below.  Work effort 
in the variable time preference, however, varies with the productivity shock; 
Figure 1 shows it to be decreasing in productivity shocks.  Combined with the 
fact that liquidity effects are identical in the two economies, the work effort 
response in the procyclical monetary policy case should be flatter in the 
flexible time preference economy, and steeper in the case of countercyclical 
policy, which is confirmed from Figures 2 and 3.  The output/consumption 
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response in both economies is positively related to work effort and the 
productivity shock; it is therefore slightly flatter in the endogenous time 
preference economy, given work effort is decreasing in productivity shocks 
for the log utility case. The endogenous discount factor is decreasing in all of 
the three cases; the steepest response occurs in the procyclical case, and the 
flattest response in the countercyclical case.7   Interest rates in both economies 
are given by the expression 1)1( −+
−
xn
nγ , and are therefore not related to 
technology shocks, and negatively related to the money injection, as implied 
by the liquidity effect, which is the reason for the responses shown in Figures 
2 and 3.  As mentioned above, the parameterization of the economies is such 
that they are identical for the fixed and flexible discount factor economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
   7Graphically, the responses seem identical across the three cases, but there are small 
quantitative differences.  Again, based on the results in Table 1, we can infer that 
monetary shocks do not contribute significantly to the variation in the discount factor. 
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Fixed Time Preference              _____ 
Endogenous Time Preference   -------- 
 
Figure 2: Procyclical Monetary Policy 
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Fixed Time Preference              _____ 
Endogenous Time Preference   -------- 
 
Figure 3: Countercyclical Monetary Policy 
 
       The intuition for the differences in equilibrium work effort in the two 
economies is as follows:8  Since the representative firm is subject to a cash 
constraint, the wage bill cannot exceed the money supply which equals the 
deposits n plus the monetary injection x.  Deposits are fixed prior to the 
realization of the shocks, so the wage bill can only vary with the monetary 
shock.  This is true of both economies.  The determination of labor supply, 
however involves equating the marginal disutility of work effort, (which is a 
constant (=A) for the functional form of utility assumed above), to its 
discounted marginal gain.  The marginal gain is the marginal value of the 
amount taken home by the worker that contributes to the next period’s money 
holdings.  In the fixed time preference case, this discounted marginal gain is 
equal to 
x
wVm
+
××
1
β , where 
x
Vm
+1 may be interpreted as the marginal value of 
                                                        
   8I thank an anonymous referee for providing this interpretation. 
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money expressed relative to the expected growth in the nominal money stock. 
Based on our analysis of the demand side, 
L
xnw += , which suggests the 
following condition must hold in equilibrium, for the fixed time preference 
economy: 
                                                           
)1( xA
wVL m+=
β  
Since the marginal value of money mV  is constant in the i.i.d case, equilibrium 
work effort must be independent of θ . In the endogenous time preference 
case, the discounting is more complex, with )(uβ appearing instead of β , in 
addition to another term involving )(uβ′ .  (See equation (14) above).  This 
means that equilibrium work effort in the endogenous time preference case, 
will, in general, depend on θ  via the endogenous discount factor.  It turns out 
that this is the key reason for the differences in the role of monetary policy, 
which will be discussed in the section below.  For example, in the log utility 
case, equilibrium labor is decreasing in the productivity shock in the presence 
of endogenous discounting.  This is perhaps the result of increasing 
impatience with higher values of θ , which could induce a higher demand for 
leisure.  For a fixed level of θ , increasing leisure has a direct and positive 
effect on utility, and also an indirect negative effect via the fall in output.  If 
θ , on the other hand is increasing across states, an increase in leisure implies 
less of a sacrifice in terms of the decrease in current utility.    
 
B. Optimal Monetary Policy 
 
In this subsection we discuss monetary policies designed to make competitive 
equilibrium Pareto optimal.  To that end, we first need to discuss what 
conditions must be imposed on the economy for monetary policy to be 
optimal.  As in the fixed time preference economy, optimal policy is designed 
to remove two types of frictions.  Firstly, there are cash-in-advance constraints 
on various transactions, so that there are inflation tax distortions that can only 
be eliminated by deflation.  Secondly, there is an additional friction imposed 
due to the inability of the representative family to transfer funds between 
goods and financial markets, which makes the financial market relatively 
more liquid.  Intuitively, then, one would expect optimal monetary policy to 
be one that varies with productivity shocks, since monetary shocks must be 
such that the marginal value of cash in the goods and financial markets is 
equated. 
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       Following an analysis similar to Fuerst (1994), it can be shown that 
optimal monetary equilibrium in the endogenous time preference economy is 
thus given by a function RSx →: , and constants )1,0(∈n , 0>mV , such that 
         )17(,
1
)(}))((1){(
))(1(
))(( 1
n
sfVsusu
sx
Vsu m
−
′′′+′≥′+
′ ββ  
                         with equality for some Ss ∈′ , 
 
  )18(,
))((
))(1)((}))((1){(
))(1(
))(( 1
sxn
sxsfVsusu
sx
Vsu m
′+
′+′′′+′≥′+
′ βγβ  
                          with equality for some Ss ∈′ , 
          )19(,1)(
))(1(
))(( =′Φ′+
′∫ sdsxsuβ  
       To derive these conditions, as in Fuerst (1994) we impose first the 
condition x > -1, since x must be allowed to take negative values in order to 
eliminate inflation-tax effects.  Additionally, optimal work effort, by 
definition, is given by L that solves 
                                        )(
)(
)(
1
2 sf
su
su
L ′=′
′
. 
From the first order conditions of this economy, the competitive equilibrium is 
Pareto optimal (or work effort is equal to the above expression) iff 
Ss ∈′∀== ,021 λλ .  It is easy to verify that this is the case iff conditions (17) 
and (18) hold.  The conditions are restricted to hold with equality for some 
Ss ∈′  because, as in Fuerst (1990) we are searching for equilibria that are 
stationary: if not the household could increase its spending in all states 
without having to curtail it in any. That is, cash-in-advance constraints must 
bind in at least one state. If the two conditions, (17) and (18) hold, the 
equilibrium condition (15) collapses to (19). 
       These conditions collapse to the definition of optimal monetary policy in 
the fixed time preference version if we set 0)( =′ uβ , and ββ ≡)(u .  Equation 
(19), of course, represents the endogenous time preference equivalent of the 
stochastic version of the Friedman rule, which arises in several cash-in-
advance models.  Equations (17) and (18), on the other hand, are of the type 
that have been shown by Fuerst (1994) to arise in the context of liquidity 
effect models.  As in the case of fixed time preference models, the conditions 
above allow a lot of flexibility, so that optimal monetary policy need not be 
unique.  The multiplicity problem arises because for any monetary policy that 
satisfies (19), it is possible to find sufficiently large n and mV to satisfy (17) 
and (18). ( See also Fuerst, 1994). 
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       To illustrate the differences in optimal monetary policy in the fixed and 
flexible time preference models, let us first consider the deterministic version 
of the model discussed above.  Since there is no uncertainty, we have 21 λλ = , 
so that there are no distortions arising because of frictions associated with 
liquidity effects.9  Optimal monetary policy is therefore required only to take 
care of inflation tax distortions.  Equation (19) implies that optimal monetary 
policy is given by 1)( −= ux β .  The fixed time preference version is simply 
the Friedman rule 1−= βx , and it is quite clear that optimal monetary policy 
can, at least in a quantitative sense, be different in the presence of endogenous 
time preference.  Equilibrium n  and mV   are given by deterministic versions 
of (17) and (18), in which these equations must hold with equality in all states. 
       In the i.i.d. case, to explicitly calculate an optimal monetary policy that 
has the characteristics described above, we follow again the strategy pursued 
in Fuerst (1994).  Since optimal monetary policy is obviously not unique, we 
search for optimal monetary equilibrium within the class in which the cash-in-
advance constraint in the financial market is “just binding”, so that 
021 == λλ , and wLxn =+ .  In terms of the definition of optimal policy 
above this means that (18) holds with for all Ss ∈′ .10  Then, as in Fuerst 
(1994), it can be shown that equilibrium n is given by 
                                    )20(, 
1
~
γ
γ
+
−= xn  
where ( ))(max~ sxx ′= .  Equations (18) and (19) imply 
                       ),(
))(1(
))(( sd
sx
VsuV mm ′Φ′+
′= ∫ β  
                                         
)21()(
))((
)(}))((1){(1 sd
sxn
sfVsusu ′Φ′+
′′′+′= ∫ βγ  
             )22(),(}))((1){(
))(1(
))(())((
1 sfVsususx
sxnVsu m ′′′+′≥′+
′+′ βγβ  
Optimal monetary policy can then be numerically computed by iterating on 
the Bellman equation (16) and using (20)-(22) to compute mVn, , and x  at 
each step of the iteration, until convergence is achieved.   
                                                        
   9To see this, note that equations (11) and (14) imply tt EE 21 λλ = . 
   10Fuerst (1994) interprets this policy as one in which the central bank stands ready to 
provide the exact amount of reserves demanded by firms at a zero interest rate.  As 
discussed in Fuerst (1993), optimal monetary policy analysis of this type is somewhat 
controversial.  However, assumptions of this type are required in order to conduct any 
meaningful analysis of optimal monetary policy in liquidity models.  
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       Simulations for the i.i.d case are summarized in Figure 4.  In Figure 4, 
there is a range of values for the utility curvature parameterσ , for which the 
optimal monetary policy in the flexible time preference case differs 
qualitatively from the optimal policy in the benchmark economy.  This range 
roughly corresponds to )07.1,1(∈σ , and the optimal policy in the benchmark 
case is countercyclical, while it is procyclical in the flexible time preference 
case. For 10 <<σ , it seems that optimal monetary policy is somewhat more 
procyclical relative to the benchmark.  For 07.1>σ , on the other hand, 
optimal monetary policy is countercyclical, but to a lesser degree than in the 
fixed time preference case.  In general, Figure 4 suggests a monetary policy 
role that is somewhat less activist than the fixed time preference case.  
 
    
Fixed Time Preference              _____ 
Endogenous Time Preference   -------- 
 
Figure 4.  Optimal Monetary Policy. 
 
       We now provide some intuition underlying these differences.  For the 
class of utility functions given by ALc −−
−−
σ
σ
1
11 , optimal labor is given by 
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                   )23()()(
))1(1/(11 σγσγθ −−− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′=′
A
ssL  
and this is also true of the fixed time preference economy.  Optimal monetary 
policy in both economies then varies with σ .  In the log utility case, 1=σ , so 
that optimal work effort is independent of productivity shocks.  For 1<σ , 
optimal work effort is increasing in productivity shocks, while for 1>σ , 
optimal work effort is decreasing in productivity shocks. 
       Now consider competitive equilibrium work effort in the two economies.  
As discussed before, competitive equilibrium work effort in the fixed time 
preference economy is independent of θ , while in the endogenous time 
preference economy it is likely to be decreasing in θ  - this is also confirmed 
by the numerical simulations studied above, presented in Figures 1-3.  
Optimal work effort for both economies, on the other hand is given by 
equation (23).  In the fixed time preference economy it is clear that for 1<σ , 
optimal monetary policy is likely to be procyclical, as we want work effort to 
be increasing in θ .  Furthermore, for 1>σ , countercyclical policy is required, 
while for 1=σ , optimal monetary policy is likely to be unresponsive (-  i.e. 
fixed independently of θ ).  However, given that competitive equilibrium work 
effort is decreasing in θ  in the endogenous discount factor economy, optimal 
monetary policy will evidently not be unresponsive, as in the fixed time 
preference model.  Consider for example the log utility case presented in 
Figure 1.  Since optimal labor is independent of θ , optimal monetary policy 
would entail counteraction of the effect of productivity shocks, which cause 
work effort to fall in the good states.  Since competitive equilibrium work 
effort is increasing in the money injection, this would be achieved by 
procyclical monetary policy.   
 
 4.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper can be described as an extension of Fuerst’s (1994) work, which 
characterizes the nature of optimal monetary policy in a general equilibrium 
model with two types of distortions.  One of these frictions is due to the 
presence of cash-in-advance restrictions.  The second friction arises due to the 
assumption that goods and financial markets are segmented, so that 
expansionary monetary policy shocks can temporarily lower the equilibrium 
interest rate, and thus lead to a liquidity effect.  Fuerst shows that these 
features can imply, (for a range of parameters), that the appropriate monetary 
policy is one which responds in an activist countercyclical manner to real 
shocks that hit the economy.  This paper extends Fuerst’s by allowing the 
representative agent’s discount factor to be endogenous, in a manner 
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suggested by Epstein (1983).  The paper demonstrates that, in the presence on 
variable time preference, the nature of optimal monetary policy can change in 
some cases.  In particular, there seems to be a smaller role for activism in the 
extended framework.  Furthermore, even in cases where the nature of optimal 
policy is similar to that of the benchmark model, carrying out the appropriate 
policy is a more complicated exercise.  The central bank now requires 
information on the preference parameters relating to subjective discount rates, 
which are not directly observable, in addition to other fundamentals such as 
the nature of productivity shocks. 
       The conclusions here are, of course, subject to similar caveats as the 
Fuerst’s (1994).  As in that paper, our model is very stylized; shocks are 
assumed to be i.i.d, and capital is inelastic.  These assumptions, however 
allow the analysis to be more tractable, in addition to maintaining 
comparability with Fuerst’s analysis.  It is also important to emphasize that 
this study has been of an exploratory nature; a simple and relatively stylised 
framework was therefore more suitable as a benchmark.    
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